

SECURITY ASPECTS OF NON-ALIGNMENT

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Non-alignment has important national-defence and security aspects and represents, *inter alia*, compatible and converging national-security doctrines. Though originally operationalized as a policy of non-participation in the military blocs headed by the Great Powers, it tolerates several types of military co-operation with those blocs. The overall military position of non-aligned states is characterized by their military-technological inferiority and by their significant military penetration by certain outside Powers. Many of the external dangers to non-aligned states flow from the outposts of the West and from elements auxiliary to the West. Hence the frequent military co-operation of non-aligned states with the East. In addition to autonomous national solutions to security problems, non-aligned states have developed elements and segments of group security. These elements are, however, far from turning them into a military bloc. Indeed non-aligned states do not desire to, and cannot, constitute another military bloc. They are, rather, the champions of a universal international security system under the auspices of the United Nations.

National-defence and security considerations have played an important role in the creation and development of non-alignment. Its founders and champions—Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Josip Broz Tito, and other leaders of the Third World—saw in non-alignment, among other things, compatible and converging national-security doctrines.¹ The strategy and policy of non-alignment has, accordingly, been used as a means to improve the security position of each individual member of the movement in the long run. During the last twenty years non-aligned states have both individually and collectively reacted to, and acted on, numerous issues bearing on international security—military bases, military threats, arms race and disarmament, UN collective-security activities, military interventions, wars and other armed conflicts, etc.; and with the growth of non-alignment, what

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¹Non-alignment was earlier designated variously as "positive neutralism", "un-alignment", and "non-engagement".

the non-aligned say and do has gained in importance.² Hence the relevance of the present topic.

WHAT IS NON-ALIGNMENT?

There is no concise and fully satisfactory definition of non-alignment although the movement has in practice evolved a consensus concerning its goals, principles, and criteria. The content of non-alignment, too, has varied from time to time, particularly at the level of policy. Besides, certain political inconveniences are inevitable with iron-clad definitions.

From the very beginning the most important ingredient of non-alignment as a long-term policy has been the assertion of national independence and of the right of even small and weak developing countries to economic, political, and social development without let or hindrance from outside. Being mostly new, poor, and weak, non-aligned states have hoped to retain their national independence and promote their economic, political, and social development through universal application of the principles of peaceful co-existence. Ten of these principles (national sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality of nations and races, non-interference and non-intervention, individual and collective security, etc.) are to be found in the Bandung Declaration (1955). (Many of them are directly taken from the UN Charter.) The Political Declaration adopted in the summit conference of non-aligned states held in Algiers (1973) mentions the following as the goals of the movement: freedom and independence of peoples and countries; general peace and equal security of all states; general enforcement of the principles of peaceful, active co-existence; democratization of international relations; overall and just co-operation; economic development; social progress; etc. (Article 7).

Thus, non-alignment as a standard of behaviour in international relations has economic, military, political, and other dimensions. Conceptually it can be placed on the isolation-neutrality-nonalignment-alignment continuum. Several attempts have been made to construct a meaningful, multi-dimensional model of non-alignment with measurable variables and a composite scope, but they have all proved unsatisfactory, and for two reasons. First, the composite scores overlap greatly

²The number of full-fledged participants at the summits has grown constantly: 1961 (Belgrade) 25; 1964 (Cairo), 47; 1970 (Lusaka), 53. At Algiers (1973) seventy-six countries were recognized as full-fledged participants: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroun, CAR, Chad, Chile, the Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, the Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Vietnam (PRG), Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, the Yemen Arab Republic, the Yemen People's Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia. There were also nine observers (all from Latin America), three guests (neutral European states), and representatives of twelve liberation movements.

with those of the neutral and "bloc" states. Secondly, the composite score rank-order (the closeness to the "ideal" score) differs grossly from the rank-order based on active participation, real prominence, and relative weight among the non-aligned.

As regards self-identification, the movement has experienced tensions on a number of occasions between those who want the movement to develop a kind of purist exclusiveness (such as Indonesia under Soekarno) and those who want the movement to acquire breadth and a degree of principled tolerance. The champions of relative openness and flexibility have had the upper hand. Their success is due to the general realization that (1) developing countries are a heterogeneous group of countries, sometimes with conflicting short-term interests; (2) that democratization of international relations is an arduous task likely to take a long time; and (3) that joint efforts are bound to have a positive influence on the behaviour of non-aligned states themselves.

As we have already stated, non-alignment was originally operationalized as a policy of non-participation in the military blocs headed by the Great Powers. It was a short- and medium-term reaction to the realities of the intense Cold War between the two opposing politico-military coalitions, popularly called the East and the West. Historically this reaction stemmed from the fact that the states newly emerging into freedom felt alienated from the conflicts between the two coalitions. It was also due to the rejection by them of some "hard-sell" recruitment practices. For Nehru, Nasser, and Tito non-alignment also meant the inadmissibility of certain kinds of military co-operation with the Great Powers and their blocs (special relations in military matters, military bases, etc.). However, since the first summit (1961), there has evolved a working definition, a definition which bans only direct participation in such military arrangements as the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the tripartite security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS), but which tolerates less direct linkages.

The Political Declaration of 1973 proclaims "the rejection of military alliances which are a part of the rivalry of the great powers" and calls for "the dismantling of military bases on which such alliances are founded" (Article 21). Thus, the movement denounces, not the institution of politico-military alliances as such and still less the principle of collective self-defence, but only a particular variety of alliances. This variety is denounced because alliances of this variety are connected with the Great Powers and are perceived as the main and self-perpetuating instrument in the hands of the Great Powers for the continuance of their dominance in international relations.

The policy of non-participation has withstood the test of time during the last twenty years. At the same time the movement has developed new dimensions and enriched the content of non-alignment. However, as the blocs are still with us, the principle of non-participation remains a major mark of orientation—as witness the rejection of Pakistan's application for membership and of Romania's and Australia's soundings for observer status. However, the application of this principle is itself a

subject of pressures, counter-pressures, and tensions within the movement. There are also several "gray zones", given the multiplicity of forms and subtle gradations in the politico-military relations of the various non-aligned states with the Great Powers. To enumerate a few of these: (1) membership in regional security organizations together with the Great Powers (most notably the Rio Pact); (2) bilateral (secret or public) military agreements with the Great Powers; (3) mutual security guarantees with the minor allies of the Great Powers (e.g. the ANZUK); (4) provision of military bases and facilities; (4) holding of joint military exercises, acceptance of large numbers of military advisers, etc.; and (5) heavy dependence on the Great Powers for military equipment, know-how, training of officers, etc.

To illustrate how the non-aligned go about these areas of uncertainty, let us take the category of military bases. During the preparations for the summit conference held in Cairo in 1964 it was proposed that the countries allowing the Great Powers to set up military bases on their soil should not be invited. This would have meant the exclusion of a score of countries. A more tolerant view, however, prevailed. The Declaration of 1973 reiterates the demand for the dismantling of all military bases and for the withdrawal of foreign troops "from all parts of the world" (Article 59). And yet numerous countries allowing military bases and providing facilities are recognized as non-aligned. This is justified on the ground that the bases were imposed upon them "by virtue of unequal agreements" and "are maintained on their soil against the wishes of their peoples" (Article 60). This assertion is not valid in all cases owing to very high unemployment and grave economic difficulties of numerous non-aligned countries. Moreover, the criteria in this respect are a little more strict for newcomers than they are for those who are already in. For instance, Malta's application for participation in the summit conference of 1973 was accepted only after much debate. The applicant also declared that it intended to terminate its military arrangements with the NATO in the late seventies. Although the providing of military bases and facilities to the Great Powers is tolerated, several countries aspiring for prominent positions in the Third World and in the movement (as, for example, Egypt and Ethiopia) feel that such facilities constitute a political liability.

INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTS

Non-alignment has developed in an international environment characterized by a precarious nuclear equilibrium between the two Super Powers and by a progressive erosion of the bipolar world order.³ (To be sure, this bipolarity was never truly universal.) In the process of dealing with the "neither-war-nor-peace" situation, the non-aligned have made their own contribution to the evolution of a polycentric structure in the world community. This evolution began with significant changes in the world political climate and the world economy and with technological and communication revolutions. The development of new weapons could not compensate for the growing gap between the theoretical military might of the Great Powers and

³For want of room, no attempt is made here to dwell on the important socio-political differences between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

their real ability to impose their will even upon very weak countries. The use of naked force by them became in political terms very costly. Being an agent of change, the non-alignment movement has gained from these shifts, although the bargaining position of individual non-aligned countries might have declined.

The growing militarization in absolute terms is another feature of the modern world. The development of nuclear weapons and means of delivery has turned practically every part of our shrinking globe into a potential battle-field. Large *de facto* demilitarized zones have vanished from the earth's surface. This has naturally affected the global balance of power and also the position of the non-aligned. For instance, the need to enhance the mobility of armed forces and the economic, military, and political disadvantages of fixed military bases in many environments have, together with other circumstances, reduced the pressures on developing countries to join the existing military blocs. However, the interests of the Great Powers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America continue to be sufficiently strong. So are the proclivities of these Powers intervening in various ways.

The process of militarization has affected non-aligned countries internally as well. Armed forces have been often employed to suppress social unrest and secessionist movements, to settle border disputes, to wage local wars, and to topple Governments. The political role and weight of the military during the last fifteen years has decidedly been on the increase. Military regimes and military-civilian coalitions of various kinds and political persuasions are well represented among the non-aligned.

The position of non-aligned states in the world cannot be properly evaluated without considering the military-strategic aspect. In geopolitical terms the interests of the Great Powers in non-aligned countries and in the Third World generally have three major dimensions.

First of all, non-aligned states are important as sources of strategic raw materials. The recent oil crisis has highlighted the real power and importance of the oil-exporting non-aligned countries. (These countries account for about one-third of the world's production and a much higher share of the world's exports.) Apart from oil, non-aligned countries account for about 32 per cent of the current world production of copper and antimony. Their share in the current world production of chromium is 30 per cent; of bauxite, 44 per cent; and of iron-ore, 16 per cent. They account for still higher percentages of the world's exports. Secondly, non-aligned countries are important inasmuch as they afford strategic positions at important land, sea, and air junctions (as, for example, Gibraltar, Suez, Malacca Straits, etc.). And, lastly, each Super Power is interested in the territories and people of such non-aligned countries as are situated close to vulnerable spots of the opposing Super Power.

In addition to the general desire to be present, to protect economic interests, and to maintain "traditional" positions these three dimensions help to explain why the Great Powers use a number of military bases and other temporary or permanent facilities (such as ports, anchorages, airports, etc.) in non-aligned countries: France has six bases in non-aligned countries; the United Kingdom and the United States have each three bases plus several facilities; whereas the Soviet Union seems to have

no permanent facilities.

The heritage of the colonial past and the more recent military and paramilitary penetration by the Great Powers take various other forms. They may take the form of "mutual defence" and security pacts, agreements for military assistance and training, agreements for the supply of arms and use of facilities, etc. France has signed the largest number of such agreements with non-aligned countries—as many as forty; the Soviet Union comes next with thirty-three; the United Kingdom has seventeen; the United States, fifteen; and the People's Republic of China, twelve. Great-Power penetration may also take the form of arms supplies. The total value of the arms supplied during the last twenty years may well be close to \$30,000 million, the biggest push having been made in 1974.⁴ The Great Powers have also undertaken to provide military instruction and training in non-aligned countries and elsewhere and have sent out military advisers and officers for the purpose.

There are several socio-political reasons for this extensive military and paramilitary penetration by the Great Powers. It is due especially to the economic and technological underdevelopment of the Third World. From this follows the *military-technological inferiority* of most non-aligned states as compared with the industrially advanced countries. Approximate global figures illustrate this important point. *The share of non-aligned countries in the world's population amounts to about 30 per cent, but their share of the world's gross national produce (GNP) is, at best, 8 per cent. While their armed forces consist of about seven million soldiers, the total of their military budgets is about \$12,500 million or approximately 6 per cent of the world's total.* These figures may give an incomplete and partly distorted picture, but they do bring out the global power relationships unmistakably. Not even the richest or the most developed among non-aligned states can win in an arms race with the Power blocs. The very substantial military-technological inferiority of non-aligned states is not likely to be reduced in the foreseeable future.

NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY PROBLEMS OF THE NON-ALIGNED

A recent study of the local wars fought between 1945 and the end of 1969 shows that there were ninety-seven such wars and that as many as ninety-three of these occurred in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁵ These wars were fought in fifty-nine countries spread over three continents, and their total duration was about 255 years. This gives an average of 10.22 war-days for each day during this period of "peace". The study also shows that the number and duration of the local wars fought on the three continents are on the increase. The main type of war in our days is no longer international frontier wars, but internal anti-regime wars and, particularly, wars waged with foreign participation (forty-nine wars with a duration of 168.75 years).

⁴Estimates of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for the period 1950-72, made on the basis of a different typology, are too low in our view. See *SIPRI Year book 1973* (Stockholm, 1973), pp. 320-1.

⁵Istvan Kende, *Local Wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 1945-1969* (Budapest, 1972). We do not propose here to discuss the author's debatable typology and definitions.

Far shorter than internal anti-regime wars (A-type) are internal "tribal" wars (B-type) (secessionist, religious, minority, etc.) and frontier wars (C-type). There were fifteen B-type wars, with a duration of 29.52 years, and as many C-type wars, with a duration of 10.9 years. Region-wise, twenty-nine local wars were fought in Asia; twenty-five in the Middle East; sixteen in sub-Saharan Africa; and twenty-three in Latin America.

The study shows that in all conflicts during 1945-69 foreign participation was the general practice. Indeed, after 1964, no internal anti-regime war was launched without it. The study also shows that there is a positive correlation between foreign participation and duration of conflict. Wars with foreign participation accounted for 62.4 per cent of all military events, and for 69.6 per cent of the total duration of such events. During the period under consideration the main interventionist Powers were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Portugal (which participated in twenty-five, seventeen, twelve, and three wars respectively).

These statistics indicate that political and social instability create difficult security problems for developing countries. These countries have experienced, and are exposed to, numerous foreign interventions, mainly by colonialist and imperialist Powers.

The types of local wars described above differ, however, from the principal threats, real or potential, to the security of non-aligned countries. They fall into four categories:

1. Internal dangers (ethnic, political, religious, social, etc.);
2. External armed conflicts, resulting from (a) certain vestiges of colonialism (such as the colonial possessions of France, Spain, and the United Kingdom); (b) racism, especially as practised in the regimes based on White supremacy (such as the Republic of South Africa, Zimbabwe [Rhodesia], Namibia [South-West Africa], etc.); and (c) the problem of Israel;
3. External armed conflicts between a non-aligned state and a Great Power or between a non-aligned state and an ally or client state of a Great Power (such as Cuba v. USA; India v. China; India v. Pakistan; Iraq v. Iran; Syria v. Turkey; etc.); and
4. External armed conflicts between one non-aligned state and another (such as Ethiopia v. Somalia v. Kenya; Iraq v. Kuwait; South Yemen v. North Yemen; etc.).

There are, of course, interconnexions and combinations of these four categories as well (1+2; 1+3; 1+4; 2+3; 2+4; 3+4; etc.).

SOLUTIONS

As the types and gravity of the internal and external dangers as perceived by the leaders vary significantly in time and space, so do the solutions evolved for the various situations. If we look at the variety of these solutions, we shall notice substantial

variations in the degree of autonomy and self-reliance manifested by individual non-aligned countries. Also, within this variable, there are substantial variations in the degree of autonomy manifested by individual non-aligned countries *vis-à-vis* the Great Powers and their allies. In view of their military-technological inferiority non-aligned states find it difficult to maintain a high degree of autonomy in dealing with the second and third types of dangers mentioned above. Whenever confronted with a stronger and technically superior opponent, a non-aligned state has little choice but to seek military co-operation with a Power opposed to that opponent and to strengthen and reinforce it. Indeed it has no viable alternative. As the process of emancipation of the Third World has been going on most often "at the expense" of the privileges and influence enjoyed by the West in other years, and as the outposts and auxiliary elements of the West predominate in the second and third categories of dangers, it is logical that in a large number of cases the Power befriended by non-aligned states should be the Soviet Union (and, occasionally, the People's Republic of China). The Soviet Union has been the first to break the monopoly of the West in the arms market and to undermine the attempts of the West to keep many areas of the Third World partly demilitarized and dependent.

But there are also cases where non-aligned states have sought military assistance from the United States and its allies. When invaded or threatened with aggression, especially by a Western Power, non-aligned states (like India, Jordan, the Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Zaire, and Zambia) have appealed for help either to another Western Power (clearly with a view to exploiting contradictory interests among the Western Powers) or simultaneously to a Western and an Eastern Power.

And then there are cases where, either on their own or on express request, the Great Powers have offered military assistance to countries and regimes facing grave internal dangers (as, for example, to Nigeria). They have, besides, aided some non-aligned states engaged in confrontation with some other non-aligned states. The last represents, in fact, a "spill-over" of the global rivalry between the West and the East.

Although the general trend in the post-colonial era has been towards greater military emancipation or towards the "domestication" of the military establishments in the Third World, this process has not been unilinear. For example, the increasing concentration on military R & D and the prohibitive costs of producing advanced weapons have, partially or temporarily, reversed the process of military emancipation in several non-aligned states (like the states of the Middle East).

Apart from objective barriers, we may note certain subjective obstacles to defence autonomy and self-reliance. For want of domestic military-intellectual traditions in many non-aligned states the overall level of development in the sphere of military thought and doctrine is low on the average. There has been indiscriminate borrowing from the advanced countries, and the doctrines borrowed are either inappropriate or poorly adapted.

As a matter of principle, non-aligned states are supposed to build their security on two foundations, supplemented by a third.

The first of these foundations is a "system of *collective security* based on principles

which, overcoming ideological differences, are aimed at regulating international relations . . . The UN can be an effective instrument in promoting international peace and security" (Articles 12 and 74 of the Political Declaration of 1973). It is well known that non-aligned states have been very active in trying to strengthen the United Nations in general and the peace-keeping role of the world body in particular. They have worked actively in order to breathe life into the international security system of the United Nations and extricate it from the rivalries of the Great Powers. They have sought to utilize the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations in the Congo, Cyprus, and the Middle East. They have endorsed UN peace observation missions in India and Pakistan, the Lebanon, West Irian, and Yemen, as well as in Vietnam. The active participation of non-aligned states in these activities has been facilitated by the fact that the Great Powers are disqualified from making contributions to UN peace-keeping forces. However, in order to ensure the highest possible impartiality on the part of those contributing men and material to UN peace-keeping forces, the choice has increasingly fallen on neutral states and on minor states of the two Power blocs as most conflicts have occurred in the Third World. Of all non-aligned states India has made the biggest contribution to UN peace-keeping operations.⁶

Non-aligned states have also advocated gradual extension of partly demilitarized and de-nuclearized "zones of peace and co-operation" in different parts of the world (as, for example, in the Indian Ocean, in the Mediterranean area, in South-East Asia, and in Latin America); universal and complete disarmament; etc. They have actively participated in the Geneva disarmament talks and have, on many occasions, played decisive parts in breaking deadlocks.

Second, in the absence of a viable universal system of security, non-aligned states rely on *autonomous national-defence and security systems*, sometimes supported and supplemented by elements of group security. We find among non-aligned states a great variety of national systems.

When we examine these systems, we find that at the doctrinal level Clausewitzian concepts predominate as war is still viewed as a rational instrument of State policy. The generally preferred category of wars is that of limited wars for the achievement of limited objectives. Another notable feature is the incongruity between the official political and military doctrines in spite of the Clausewitzian prescriptions to the contrary. The military doctrines of most non-aligned states envisage a purely defensive strategy, but the biggest among them do not exclude preventive offensive operations in their regions. Accordingly one finds in their military systems mobile strategic forces outside territorial military districts—forces directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief or the Chief of Staff. The great majority of non-aligned states cannot and do not even think of going nuclear, but a few are (or were) serious aspirants for membership of the nuclear club. (With one foot India is already in it; and Argentina, Egypt, and Indonesia may follow suit.) If the world or regional strategic balance should change appreciably, we might very well expect more aspirants.

⁶SIPRI Yearbook, 1973, n. 5, ch. 6.

Generally speaking (and taking into account the relative abundance of the human factor, scarcity of economic wealth, and the relative military-technological inferiority), one would expect that optimal national-defence doctrines of non-aligned states would (a) be purely defensive; (b) envisage a kind of people's war; and (c) rely on mass participation by the people in the defence effort. In fact, in many parts of the Third World, there still survive local, tribal, national, or regional "unauthorized" subsystems or archaic or "feudal" militias. All able-bodied men in these parts are warriors whenever an emergency arises or whenever military operations are under way. In a few countries, such subsystems are partly integrated into the State armed forces (as, for example, in Ethiopia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, *et al.*). Frequently such militia subsystems become the backbone of autonomist and secessionist movements and clash with the modern armed forces of the State (as they have done, for example, in West Irian in Indonesia, in Northern Burma, in Assam in India, in Kurdistan in Iraq, in Southern Sudan, in Ogaden in Ethiopia, in Northern Chad, in Northern Mali, etc.).

Most of the recent attempts to create modern militia subsystems are by populist and "radical" regimes. These regimes have introduced mass military training for the youth and created different kinds of paramilitary formations (as, for example, in several Arab states, Cambodia, the Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Tanzania, *et al.*). Quite a few regimes have even tried to replace the expensive standing armies by such semi-regular formations (mostly party militias). Although they have sought to justify such militia subsystems by pointing to some real or assumed external threat, it is well known that they mean to use them as military and political counterweights against politically unreliable standing armies. Some of the recent military *coups d'état* are in fact pre-emptive blows by the military bureaucracy. With the downfall of several "radical" regimes the idea of mass militia has for some time been politically discredited.

The modern paramilitary and militia formations in non-aligned states have met with different kinds of fate: in some states they have survived; in some other states they have been fused with the standing armies (as, for example, in Tanzania); and in yet other states they are only activated from time to time (as, for example, in several Arab countries).

Today almost all non-aligned states rely for their national defence primarily or exclusively on standing professional or mixed professional-conscriptive armies of the conventional type. So far as we know, among non-aligned regimes, only Yugoslavia, the Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Government of Cambodia have adopted the doctrine of people's war.⁷ Since the late sixties Yugoslavia has built up a substantial system of mass territorial defence and civil defence. The number of reservists (mostly in the guerrilla units) in the more lightly armed territorial component of the armed forces exceeds the peacetime strength of the regular operational army. The official target is actively, regularly,

⁷The recognition of the two latter movements—which were yet to emerge as states—as full-fledged participant was the subject of a lively controversy and protests.

and continuously to engage about 5 per cent of the total population of the country in the defence preparations of the armed forces in the short-run and about 12 per cent of the total population in the long run. Apart from the three above-mentioned non-aligned states several "associated" liberation movements, too, have adopted the doctrine of people's war.

History has shown that people's war offers a truly effective strategy against even a much stronger and better-equipped enemy. Why, then, have most non-aligned states ignored, or refrained from adopting, this doctrine and its tool—namely, mass participation of the people in defence?

The answer lies in the social fabric of the Third World. We have noted already that the most frequent type of large-scale conflicts in developing countries is internal wars. It is obvious that political instability (caused by unresolved cultural, economic social, and other problems or by deep internal divisions and exacerbated by foreign intrusions and interventions) is not conducive to the adoption of the doctrine of people's war. The doctrine of people's war calls for a fairly high degree of internal cohesion and well-developed machinery for political and social control. These demands can be fulfilled also by revolutionary movements only if they are well organized and enjoy wide support among the people. Few non-aligned states can fulfil these demands. Hence only under exceptional circumstances do the ruling groups and military establishments accept the doctrine of people's war as the foundation of their defence systems. Military training for the entire population of a country and distribution of modern light arms are viewed, and often rightly, as constituting a very real danger to internal security. Critics of such systems in the Third World also allege that they can be as expensive as, and are generally less efficient than, conventional standing armies.

GROUP SECURITY AND NON-ALIGNED STATES

Is there anything between the present system of world security, which is largely ineffective, and the national-defence systems, which are often insufficient or inappropriate? During the last twenty years there have been some two dozen mutual-security schemes, involving about forty countries which are non-aligned at present. Few of these endeavours, however, cover more than a region. Indeed some of them (as, for example, the *Entente* in West Africa, originally the Arab League) have had former colonial Powers as sponsors. One of the most interesting of these is the attempt made by the Casablanca group consisting of several Arab and sub-Saharan African states and envisaging a joint military command in Accra, headed by an Egyptian General, and joint forces. Mutual-security schemes, though largely ineffective, have been frequent among Arab states.

Today there exist only some elements and segments of group security among non-aligned states:

- (1) *Mutual-security components of the Arab League, linking twenty countries, and a United Arab Command (UAC)*. Created in 1964, the UAC has an Egyptian General as titular commander of the Arab armies confronting Israel. It has tried

to modernize these forces, to standardize the equipment, and generally to strengthen the defence effort. It also channels funds from other Arab countries to Israel's neighbours and to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The mutual-security mechanisms of the Arab states were largely ineffective militarily until the autumn of 1973. During the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, however, these mechanisms contributed to (and in some cases ensured) participation by military units from Iraq, Jordan, and several other Arab states alongside with Egyptian and Syrian forces; joint support and logistics operations; co-ordinated purchase and acquisition of arms; etc. Results achieved by Arab states through co-ordinated action in the matter of oil prices were better still. After the war joint military industries were set up by Arab states with an initial capital of \$1,100 million and with headquarters in Cairo.

(2) *Rudimentary group-security component of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).* The OAU Charter mentions only "co-operation for defence and security" and provides for a Defence Commission. The Solemn Declaration on General Policy adopted by the OAU at its 1973 summit appealed to all member states to go "collectively to the aid of those who have been victims of the subversive manoeuvres of colonialism and new colonialism". More specifically, it expressed the OAU "determination to increase . . . [its] moral support and material assistance" to liberation movements in the southern part of Africa; "to aid and support" the states situated on the border of "the territories engaged in the struggle"; and to aid in "the reconstruction of liberated areas". The OAU has done a good deal in the matter of providing financial, political, and logistic support to liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, in Zimbabwe, and in South Africa. However, the idea of creating joint mobile strategic forces—mooted by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and proposed later by Nigeria—is yet to be carried out.

(3) *About thirty bilateral agreements signed between and among non-aligned countries.* These contain clauses on co-operation in defence matters (such as providing training, lending instructors, officers, and pilots, selling arms and spare parts, etc.).

(4) *Informal arrangements to the same effect between one non-aligned state and another and between non-aligned states and national-liberation movements.* For example, many non-aligned countries provided military and paramilitary assistance to the Algerian liberation movement as well as to several liberation movements in sub-Saharan Africa. During the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 Egypt (and, to a lesser extent, Syria) received assistance also from several non-Arab non-aligned countries by way of arms, ammunition, drugs, blood, etc. A number of badly wounded Egyptian soldiers were treated in Yugoslav military hospitals.

The Political Declaration of 1973 contains the following clauses on group security:

"The participants have devoted special attention to the strengthening of security and defence of the non-aligned countries from all outside dangers. They have expressed the resolution . . . to reinforce their solidarity and mutual assistance in

the event of threats to their independence and territorial integrity" (Article 67) "the non-aligned . . . undertake the obligation to aid Egypt, Syria, and Jordan with [*sic*] all means in the liberation of their occupied territories" (Article 29); "Israel's persistence in defying the international community and the United Nations will force the non-aligned countries themselves, and within the UN together with member countries of this organization, to take individual and collective measures against Israel in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter" (Article 31); "The Conference underlines the need for co-operation of non-aligned with all countries which oppose colonialism and neocolonialism, for the purpose of lending active support to the armed struggle of African liberation movements" (Article 48); etc.

Although these statements are more explicit than earlier pronouncements, they envisaged no new form of expressing solidarity (apart from making available voluntary bilateral, and partly group assistance). Nor do they envision any collective body outside the United Nations to express solidarity or to make assistance available. When a non-aligned country feels threatened, other non-aligned states are free to elect whether, when, and how they are to offer help. The statement by the US Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, that the non-aligned movement is "an alignment of the non-aligned" and is in no wise different from the existing military alliances headed by the Great Powers has thus no basis except in his rich imagination. Indeed, in making that statement he was only repeating an old charge, rejected many times over by leaders of non-alignment like Nehru and many others. The analogy between the solidarity of non-aligned states and the military alliances headed by the Great Powers breaks down at two levels. At the operational level:

(1) There is no treaty of military alliance or mutual security, and non-aligned states are under no mandatory obligation to help one another in the face of aggression.

(2) There are no formal or informal arrangements or procedures at the level of the movement, agreed upon in advance and providing for group security outside the United Nations.

(3) There are no institutions of military and security co-operation (joint command, joint staff, etc.), no joint forces, no integrated network of communications, etc.

(4) There is no standardization of arms, equipment, installations, practices, etc.

(5) There is no common strategy, no joint R&D efforts, no military bases of one non-aligned country on the territory of another.

(6) There is no machinery for mediating political disputes and resolving military conflicts within the movement.

At a more general level:

(1) Among non-aligned states there is no will to create another military bloc, and it is very unlikely that such a desire would appear in the foreseeable future.

(2) There exists no economic, military-technological, or communication base for the military integration of non-aligned states. Besides, the level of their military autonomy is unduly low.

(3) Being a polycentric movement, it has within it no dominant or core country that could conceivably link the four continents.

(4) There is no ideological congruity within the movement although the role of ideology is contradictory in politico-military blocs.

In spite of its internal weaknesses and the resistance it has met with on the international scene the non-aligned movement can be credited with several important contributions to world peace. It has served as an active catalytic agent in the transition towards a polycentric power structure in the world community, and often as a shock-absorber between the two blocs, diverting and softening possibly very grave global clashes. It has stimulated "dovish" and conciliatory political currents within the blocs. Through self-organization of the Third World the movement has contributed to the cultural, economic, military, and political emancipation of developing countries and to speedier elimination or restriction of colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, and racism. It has made world public opinion more sensitive to the gap between the rich and the poor nations, which possibly constitutes in the long run the gravest danger to world peace. Above all, non-aligned states have been the prime champions of a universal international security system under the auspices of the United Nations.

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